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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1466 
___________ 
 
UBLESTER MUNDO-VIOLANTE, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LORETTO FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-00174) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 22, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 29, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Ublester Mundo-Violante is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in 
1996.  In 2006, he was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Western 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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District of Virginia to 180 months of imprisonment following his guilty plea for drug-
trafficking and weapons offenses.  The sentencing judge, at Mundo-Violante’s request, 
recommended in his judgment of sentence that Mundo-Violante be assigned to the 
Federal Correctional Institution in Morgantown, West Virginia (“FCI Morgantown”), 
which is a minimum-security facility. 
 Following sentencing, in order to determine Mundo-Violante’s placement in a 
federal facility, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), utilized the Security Designation 
and Custody Classification Manual.  Pursuant to the Manual, inmates who are not 
citizens of the United States are subject to a “Deportable Alien” Public Safety Factor 
(“PSF”) which renders them ineligible to be incarcerated at minimum-security facilities.  
(See Program Statement 5100.08, effective Sept. 12, 2006.)  Because Mundo-Violante is 
not a citizen of the United States, the BOP assigned him to the Federal Correctional 
Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania (“FCI Loretto”), a low-security facility.1  In 2010, 
while still serving his federal sentence, the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) lodged a detainer against Mundo-Violante.   
 In August 2014, Mundo-Violante filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania—his district of confinement—listing the Warden of FCI Loretto 
(“Warden”) as defendant.  Mundo-Violante appeared to argue that the BOP erroneously 
                                              
1BOP institutions are classified into five security levels.  A low-security facility is one-
level higher than a minimum-security facility, which has the lowest level of security. 
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applied a Management Variable2 (based upon an erroneous and/or expired ICE 
immigration detainer) in order to determine his security designation.  He claimed that as a 
result of that error, he has been deemed ineligible for placement at a minimum-security 
facility.  Mundo-Violante requested that the District Court “dislodge” the expired 
detainer and order the Warden from further relying upon a Management Variable, 
presumably so that he may be transferred to a minimum-security prison.  
 After the Warden filed an answer to the petition, the Magistrate Judge issued a 
report recommending that Mundo-Violante’s petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
because it did not challenge the fact or duration of his custody, or the execution of his 
sentence.  The District Court adopted the recommendation over Mundo-Violante’s 
objections.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 2253(a). 
We review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of a habeas petition on jurisdictional 
grounds.  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2002).  We will 
summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6, and may do so on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
                                              
2 The BOP applies a Management Variable when an inmate’s “placement has been made 
and/or maintained at an institution level inconsistent with the inmate’s security score—a 
score which may not completely/accurately reflect his or her security needs.”  (See 
Program Statement 5100.08.) 
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 Section 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner 
who is challenging . . .  the execution of his sentence.”  Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  While we have noted that 
“the precise meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy,” we have made it clear that a 
challenge under § 2241 must be to the manner in which the sentence is being “put into 
effect” or “carr[ied] out.”  Id. at 242-43; see also Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 
(3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that, in order for a prisoner to challenge the execution of his 
sentence under § 2241, he must allege that the “BOP’s conduct was somehow 
inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment”). 
 To the extent that Mundo-Violante’s § 2241 petition presented a direct challenge 
to his ICE detainer, we agree with the District Court that because Mundo-Violante is not 
“in custody” pursuant to that detainer, he may not seek relief under § 2241.  See, e.g., 
Zolicoffer v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 315 F.3d 538, 540-41 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 
cases).3  Likewise, we agree with the District Court that to the extent Mundo-Violante 
challenged his security designation, the claim is not cognizable in a § 2241 petition 
because it does not challenge the basic fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the 
“essence of habeas.”  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  Indeed, 
                                              
3 Moreover, even if the District Court had jurisdiction to consider Mundo-Violante’s 
claim, as the Warden correctly notes, contrary to Mundo-Violante’s assertion, the ICE 
detainer that has been lodged against him has not expired.  Indeed, it remains active 
throughout Mundo-Violante’s prison term for his federal conviction.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.7. 
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Mundo-Violante does not argue (nor does the record support a finding that) the 
sentencing court expressed any view about the appropriate security designation for him.4   
 To the extent, however, that Mundo-Violante argued in his petition that the BOP’s 
ultimate decision to place him in a low-security facility (based upon his security 
designation) violates a direct order of the sentencing court, we determine that it appears 
that such a claim may fall within the purview of § 2241.  See Cardona, 681 F.3d at 537.  
As mentioned, the sentencing court recommended (at Mundo-Violante’s request) that he 
be assigned to FCI Morgantown—a minimum-security facility.  Assuming arguendo that 
this claim is cognizable under § 2241, we conclude that Mundo-Violante was not entitled 
to relief in any event because he does not state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional 
right.   
 As the Warden argued in his motion to dismiss, neither BOP policy nor the Due 
Process Clause gives a prisoner a liberty interest in a particular housing location or 
custody level while under the jurisdiction of correctional authorities.  See generally Olim 
v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1983) (holding that an inmate has no justifiable 
expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison or state), abrogated on 
other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); Davis v. Carlson, 837 
F.2d 1318, 1319 (5th Cir. 1988) (determining that a prisoner has no right to be transferred 
                                              
4 Additionally, we note that although Mundo-Violante argues that the BOP improperly 
applied a Management Variable in order to determine his security designation, the record 
reflects that the BOP did no such thing.  Indeed, the BOP relied only upon the Deportable 
Alien PSF. 
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to facility closer to family).  Moreover, the assignment of a Deportable Alien PSF, in 
itself, does not implicate the Due Process Clause either.  See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 
(determining that a protected liberty interest is “generally limited to freedom from 
restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life”).  Mundo-Violante’s PSF classification and its 
resulting consequences of disqualification for assignment to certain facilities, as with 
other security classifications, is not outside what a prisoner “may reasonably expect to 
encounter as a result of his or her conviction in accordance with due process of law.”  
Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (explaining that 
prisoners have no legitimate due process concerns in their prison classifications).  Thus, 
the claim is without merit. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  However, we 
modify the judgment to deny, rather than dismiss, the petition to the extent that the 
District Court had jurisdiction to consider Mundo-Violante’s claim regarding his 
placement at FCI Loretto.5   
 
                                              
5 The Warden’s combined motion to supplement the appendix and to request that we take 
judicial notice of Mundo-Violante’s criminal sentencing transcript is granted. 
 
